I say what you can't, I say what they can't, and most importantly I say what I can't. Confused? Yea, so am I.
Monday, 25 July 2011
Some Theoretically Theoretical Theories
Friday, 8 July 2011
South Sudan: An inevitable split, but at the right time
Tuesday, 5 July 2011
The Narrative on Sudan: What we can learn
With the recent tumult that I caused in Al Jazeera I think more people are starting to realize the effects of the false narratives on Sudan. Well I hope that's the case. I know for a fact that I'm not the first to apprehend the short-sighted reporting of Sudan's numerous conflicts. I'm also not the first to address the issue publicly.
We are at a time where all this doesn't matter anymore. What matters is what's said now and in the near future. The recession in the South has to be looked at more objectively, because while independence is a cause for celebration other internal issues might cast some doubt on the new-born nation's stability. We basically have to take the sentimental aspect out of every equation.
I am very grateful to Al Jazeera for following up on my complaint, and on their recently launched series of documentaries on Sudan. They've definitely exerted an effort into asking the people that matter, local experts, political scientists, and political activists.
But I want to give special gratitude to someone who has passionately reported on Sudan for the last couple of years. She's written a book on Sudan called "Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide.” I haven’t read it yet, but it’s definitely on my “Books to buy” list (buy, not read J ). That someone is Rebecca Hamilton.
She’s a special correspondent on Sudan for the Washington Post, and has been published by almost every outlet you can think of. Here are a few: Foreign Affairs, The Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, The New Republic, The International Herald Tribune and Newsweek. You know what; I think she even writes on my blog when I’m not paying attention.
Anyways, I’ve been religiously following her reports on Sudan, and as I recently found out, she’s been paying attention to the real issues in Sudan before I even started this blog (not really, but it was back in November 2010).
Here’s an extract from her article “'Oil-Rich' Abyei: Time to Update the Shorthand for Sudan's Flashpoint Border Town?”, published by the Pulitzer Centre:
“.. Accordingly, the number of articles on the Abyei referendum has sky-rocketed. Read any of the media coverage and you’ll be hard-pressed not to find the phrase “oil-rich” placed somewhere in front of the town’s name. But these days the accuracy of the journalistic short-hand is questionable.
In 2004, when the final stages of the negotiations for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were underway, the Abyei area was indeed “oil rich.” There were two major oilfields to the east of Abyei town, Heglig and Bamboo, and another to the north called Diffra.
Back then, the combined production of the three fields was an estimated 76,600 barrels per day (bpd). If youcrunch the numbers, this amounted to 25 percent of Sudan’s annual oil production. With so much at stake, “oil-rich” summed up perfectly the reasons why Abyei was an obstacle to the conclusion of the peace agreement.
But we are now in 2010. In the intervening six years, two factors have diminished the accuracy of the “oil-rich” label:
First, oil production from Heglig, Bamboo, and Diffra has declined across the board. From the 76,600 bpd of 2004, the 2009 estimates for the three fields dropped to 28,300 bpd. Meanwhile, production from outside the area increased. By early 2009, “oil-rich” Abyei only accounted for 5 percent of Sudan’s annual production.”
You can read the full article here.
Tuesday, 21 June 2011
Sudan: the effects of misrepresentation
To say the current conflict in Sudan has been underreported would be an understatement. Not only has it been underreported, but Sudan as a whole has been more or less forgotten by the West and its neighbours.
Alex De Waal made a compelling point on his SSRC blog where he points out that there’s a “Missing Academic Generation” on Sudan. He claims that there’s a missing generation of scholars on Sudan. There are those who taught and lived in Sudan in the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s; and there’s the new breed that are producing new literature on Sudan. But none in between. He narrows down the reasons to the country’s self isolation, US imposed sanctions and Arabicization of the education system.
That’s fine; we all know the detrimental effects of isolation and sanctions. North Korea is a glaring example. However, a sudden surge of comparatively little media attention showed the more worrying effects of isolation and sanctions, and that’s misrepresentation.
Most articles being written about Sudan these days highlight the conflict as being more or less oil related. Every single article that tries to address the issue in Abyei paints a one-dimensional picture of the conflict. The phrase “oil-rich region of Abyei” is more common in literature about Sudan these days than a plausible solution. Now that the fighting has spilled over the state’s border, South Kurdofan gets an honourable mention as “oil rich South Kurdofan.”
The problem with such reporting is that the real stories get lost in the middle. Western reporters have failed miserably in addressing the real issues behind the conflict in Sudan. They seem to concentrate way too much on the oil wealth of the conflict ridden regions, and in doing that not paying much attention to other issues.
A recent news story about the development plans for South Sudan claimed that the World Bank recommended a $75 million trust fund for development purposes, while at the same time the government of the South is planning a $50 million independence celebration. This is ludicrous. It is unacceptable. But is it being disparaged? No, because people are too busy thinking about the “genocides” happening all over Sudan.
What’s more deplorable than all this is the overuse of the word “genocide.” Thanks to the over publicized Nickolas Kristof, Darfur and all other conflict regions in Sudan are now synonymous with genocide, ethnic cleansing and human rights violations. Every single report I have read about Sudan in the last 6 months – with no exceptions – has mentioned genocide at least once. A recent article posted on Nicholas Kristof’s blog, written by Samuel Totten, asks if Omar Al Bashir is up to genocide again. The base for this argument is the current hostilities in the Nuba Mountains in South Kurdofan. The region, mind you, is home to 30,000 rebel fighters who took up arms in a rebellion to demand their rights.
Some of you at this point will automatically assume that I’m a supporter of Omar Al Bashir and the NCP. I’m far from that. I’m not denying the deaths and violence, but using the genocide label so freely distorts the picture and is very counterproductive to those who are trying to voice their concerns.
So the point here is that when you label a conflict like that in the Nuba Mountains as genocide, you automatically remove the will, courage and audacity of those who took up arms from the equation. They become helpless civilians rather than freedom fighters (or whatever you want to call them). There’s a huge responsibility on the reporter to tell the story how it is. It is actually extremely condescending to have a western reporter classify the conflict in the country as genocide when it’s not, because of the sympathy and pity that are associated with the term.
This misrepresentation of events in Sudan is more dangerous than most people think, and because the conflict in Sudan is so underreported, we tend to inadvertently rely on such reports coming from the ground.
The coverage of the Arab revolutions was so immaculate because reporters knew the details of most of the inner workings of the political systems in the Arab countries, and most of the history associated with them. In Sudan’s case however, people just see governmental offences on African dominated “oil-rich” regions, they draw their conclusion there and then, and call it genocide.
Sudan’s history is intricate and requires an understanding. Even the local historians and political scientists – whose views are never taken into consideration when the issue of Sudan arises – are currently having a hard time understanding the predicament that the government has gotten itself in.
Mansour Khalid, a profound Sudanese political figure, published a book called “A Government They Deserve” in 1989. In this book he highlights how, since independence in 1956, the Sudanese elite have relentlessly failed their country and their people. I absolutely agree. It has been the North’s duty and responsibility – since they’re the educated ones – to ensure a united egalitarian multi-ethnic country, and not only has the North failed but it succeeded in doing exactly the opposite. You have to keep in mind that this book was written before the advent of the NCP. I could only imagine what Dr Khalid would have to say now.
The problems in Sudan are real and very serious, and I personally think it’s time that the Sudanese “elite” take responsibility and act for the future of the country as a whole. For that to happen, political, ethical, racial and religious differences have to be put aside. The government needs to stop categorizing the intellectuals as Umma Party or Communist Party, and take their advice where necessary; because in all honesty, they need as much help as they can get. This is no time to put the blame on political parties or corrupt officials, Sudan’s problem needs to be solved and it needs to be solved now, not tomorrow or the day after.
There has to be immediate, unbiased coverage of the hostilities in the South and West of the country. Calls for the genocide police and classifying rebellions as genocidal attempts by the government is doing injustice to those on the ground fighting for their rights.
Sudan: Not ethnicity, but incompetence
Many Sudanese people – even the so called political thinkers and intellectuals – blame Sudan’s failure as a state on the myriad of ethnicities that inhabit it. If you care enough to hear out this preposterous blaming game, they all eventually end up blaming the British and their divide and concur tactics. Well, the British wanted to concur, is there a way of morally concurring a nation? There isn’t.
Almost 60 years on, you still get the occasional “Sudan Expert” – usually a Northern Sudanese – claiming to have found the solution to Sudan’s problems. And nine times out of ten that solution would be for us to “embrace” our differences. I’m sure, ever since Sudan’s independence this solution would have been proposed on a daily basis.
Recognizing the ethnicity issue as a cause for all the tumult is good. But blaming the country’s consistent failures on it is inexcusable. A variety of ethnicities with conflicting demands is certainly not unique to Sudan, which is uncommon belief among most Sudanese. We constantly think that we are the only country in the world with conflicting ethnic groups. But we’re not. We’re not even the only one in the region, let alone the world.
Nigeria, for example, is more or less divided into three regions with dominant tribes. There are the Hausa in the north, the Igbo in the east, and the Yoruba in the west. All these tribes have sub-tribes. Nigeria being the most populated country in Africa has done a very impressive job in establishing a pseudo-democracy given the number of tribes that it accommodates.
Rwanda is another example. Rwanda’s current stability should make every Sudanese feel ashamed of our failure to contain our differences. Not only does Rwanda have conflicting ethnic groups, but the dominant Hutu waged an all out extermination of the Tutsi minority. After the atrocities of 1994, the Rwandan government has managed to establish a functioning system of governance and a stable economy under the patriarchal leadership of Paul Kagame.
It is self evident from Sudan’s history that the ethnicity issue was never made a priority. Not one president or prime minister has ever made a veritable effort to address the people’s differences. It seems that this was the case because, technically, the only people to have voiced their concerns and taken up arms in the early years of independence were the southerners; a bold move which was seen as audacious from the ever so chauvinistic north.
So when the southerners first formed a rebel army back in 1955, it was viewed as mutiny. The Sudanese government’s reaction was not much different from the reactions of the current Arab despots slaughtering their people. It seems the decision makers at the time thought the southerners didn’t have the right to demand their rights. Which is exactly what happened in Darfur, and South Kurdofan.
There are many reason to why the northerners think they are superior to everyone else; colour, religion, race, education and the like. The putative intellectual superiority of the north should now be called into question and scrutinized. Mainly because if the educated few can’t link armed rebellions with demands for rights and equal share of governance then who can?
So ethnicity is not the issue, it’s our leaders. They have a tendency to be incompetent. They have a tendency to deny minorities their rights, their freedoms and sometimes their modest existence. So no, I do not buy this hypothesis of embracing our differences in order to make our co-existence plausible, because that will help no one. What might help is if our government fully recognizes every region as significant in its own way from a political point of view; we can leave the emotional bonding for a later time.
Thursday, 16 June 2011
Sudan?.. Not interested!
Sunday, 29 May 2011
How much are we worth?

Once upon a time, someone somewhere said that a human life is priceless. Really now?
Let’s see why. Well, for starters, humans are superior to other creatures (I am quoting from text, in my opinion this is far from the truth). We have the ability to think, to solve, to innovate, to preempt, and to analyze; basically, we have a lot of abilities that single us out as superior.
As far as priorities go, we always get first priority; housing, food, medical care etc. Our needs are always put before the needs of a beaver, or an oak tree for instance. Which kind of makes sense. I mean, surely the contribution of a beaver to capacity building is limited to teeth-related tasks.
However, the claim that a human life is “priceless” has been invalidated, unremittingly, in recent times. People don’t seem to matter anymore. Pay close attention to what I’m about to say next (because you might quote it in the future, and if you do, give me a mention will you!?).
A human life is worth whatever its eradication begets.
This ominous reality seems worse the more you try to comprehend its extremities. The extremities being the return on ending a human life, and the number of human lives deemed expendable relative to the return on their eradication.
It will all make sense soon.
I have compiled a list of places in the world and the corresponding worth of a human life (this is completely from observation):
Iraq: Human Life = a few barrels of oil.
Egypt: Human Life = a political ideology.
Bahrain: Human Life = a crown, a religious ideology.
Congo: Human Life = not much.
Darfur: Human Life = refusal of recognition ≈ not much.
Ivory Coast: Human Life = a few more days in office.
Somalia: Human Life = a fish or two.
Afghanistan: Human Life = some opium, a strategic military position.
US: Human Life = a few barrels of oil, a strategic military position, a few more days in office, some natural gas.
UK: Human Life = whatever the US thinks.
Brazil: Human Life = economic growth.
Myanmar: Human Life = some golden stars on the shoulder, a nice bank balance.
Arab Countries with protests: Human Life = worthless.
Average Human Life = $100.
Please feel free to make additions or criticisms.
